G7 performance on energy
At a time when the G7 is being tested by rising protectionism and waning multilateralism, the influential bloc is at a critical juncture on global energy policy. Can the G7 in Kananaskis mitigate key energy challenges in a fractured multilateral system where economic protectionism and geopolitical divides are gaining prominence?
As unprecedented challenges escalate in addressing climate action and the transition to clean energy, the G7 has a historic opportunity to navigate the tensions between national interests and global imperatives to shape international energy governance.
Deliberations
The first oil crisis of the 1970s brought global energy issues to the top of the leaders’ agenda at their inaugural meeting in France in 1975. Energy issues have since consistently averaged 10% of the G7 communiqués. Only two summits between 1975 and 1989 failed to address energy — Bonn 1985 and Toronto 1988.
The prominence of energy fluctuated from 1990 to 2004, peaking in 1991 at 9%, and bottoming at 0.4% in 2002. Notable increases came between 2005 and 2014, with the strongest focus in 2009 at 38%, and the lowest in 2005 at 3%. Between 2015 and 2021, the G7 produced fewer energy conclusions, peaking in 2015 with 13%, dropping off the agenda entirely at the 2020 virtual summit and remaining low in 2021 with only 4%. Energy surged to 22% in 2022 following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, as energy security took centre stage. It remained at that level in 2023 as the conflict persisted. Energy conclusions dipped to 11% in 2024, as issues related to the Middle East, Gaza and migration topped the leaders’ agenda.
Decisions
G7 leaders made 656 energy commitments from 1975 to 2024, second only to the number of their commitments on development.
From 1975 to 1983, they produced 113 energy commitments, peaking in 1979 during the second oil shock with 43 energy commitments, representing 77% of the total.
There were no energy commitments from 1984 to 1996 apart from three in 1991, representing only 6%.
The period from 1997 to 2005 witnessed a resurgence, with 57 commitments in 2005 (27%), surpassed by 78 (24%) in 2006, when Russia hosted its sole G8 summit.
Energy commitments have since fluctuated, with a high of 41 in 2007 (12%) down to zero in 2013, 2019 and 2020. In 2021 there were 14 commitments (3%), and 2022 produced 49 (9%), followed by a record 83 (13%) in 2023. In 2024 there were 52 energy commitments, representing 11%.
Of the total 656 energy commitments, eight have been made on the key issue of eliminating inefficient fossil fuel subsidies, beginning at the 2012 summit.
Delivery
G7 members have complied with their energy commitments at an average of 85%, exceeding the overall 77% average, as assessed by the G7 Research Group.
Notable instances of high energy compliance came with 100% on commitments made in 2001, 2018 and 2023. By December 2024, compliance for the Apulia Summit was 97%, higher than for 94% for 2021 and 2022. Next highest was 89% for 2004 and 2006, and 87% for 2007 and 2008. Lower compliance came in 2012 with 68% and 2003 with 61%.
Among G7 members, energy compliance is led by the European Union at 95%, followed by the United States at 93%, the United Kingdom at 91%, Germany at 88% and Canada at 86%. Below the 85% average come France at 82%, Japan at 79% and Italy at 68%.
Recommendations
Compliance varies significantly across various types of energy commitments. Those that mention energy ministerial meetings or establish official-level energy bodies achieve 100% compliance. Those that reference public-private sector collaboration follow at 95%. Commitments linked to regulatory frameworks and defined timetables for actionable outcomes achieve 89% and 88% respectively. Highly binding energy language results in 86% compliance, while low binding language yields 81%. Notably, the three commitments since 2016 explicitly addressing climate, greenhouse gas emissions or decarbonisation achieved 86% compliance. Commitments referring to external agencies generate lower overall compliance at 78%.
This analysis reveals that institutional mechanisms, private sector engagement and clear regulatory frameworks tend to drive higher energy-related G7 compliance.
Conclusions
The urgency of the climate crisis demands a cohesive and ambitious approach to global energy policy. Despite the recent rise in protectionist tendencies, the G7 leaders at Kananaskis should agree on highly binding commitments with defined timetables for actionable outcomes that will mitigate the interconnected energy-climate crises.